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Abstract
This paper presents an extension of a proof system for encoding generic judgments, the logic FOλΔ∇ of
Miller and Tiu, with an induction principle. The logic FOλΔ∇ is itself an extension of intuitionistic logic
with ﬁxed points and a “generic quantiﬁer”, ∇, which is used to reason about the dynamics of bindings in
object systems encoded in the logic. A previous attempt to extend FOλΔ∇ with an induction principle
has been unsuccessful in modeling some behaviours of bindings in inductive speciﬁcations. It turns out
that this problem can be solved by relaxing some restrictions on ∇, in particular by adding the axiom
B ≡ ∇x.B, where x is not free in B. We show that by adopting the equivariance principle, the presentation
of the extended logic can be much simpliﬁed. Cut-elimination for the extended logic is stated, and some
applications in reasoning about an object logic and a simply typed λ-calculus are illustrated.
Keywords: Proof theory, higher-order abstract syntax, logical frameworks.
1 Introduction
This paper aims at providing a framework for reasoning about speciﬁcations of
deductive systems using higher-order abstract syntax [20]. Higher-order abstract
syntax is a declarative approach to encoding syntax with bindings using Church’s
simply typed λ-calculus. The main idea is to support the notions of α-equivalence
and substitutions in the object syntax by operations in λ-calculus, in particular
α-conversion and β-reduction. There are at least two approaches to higher-order
abstract syntax. The functional programming approach encodes the object syntax
as a data type, where the binding constructs in the object language are mapped to
functions in the functional language. In this approach, terms in the object language
become values of their corresponding types in the functional language. The proof
search approach encodes object syntax as expressions in a logic whose terms are
simply typed, and functions that act on the object terms are deﬁned via relations,
i.e., logic programs. There is a subtle diﬀerence between this approach and the
former; in the proof search approach, the simple types are inhabited by well-formed
expressions, instead of values as in the functional approach (i.e., the abstraction
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type is inhabited by functions). The proof search approach is often referred to as λ-
tree syntax [16], to distinguish it from the functional approach. This paper concerns
the λ-tree syntax approach.
Speciﬁcations which use λ-tree syntax are often formalized using hypothetical
and generic judgments in intuitionistic logic. It is enough to restrict to the fragment
of ﬁrst-order intuitionistic logic whose only formulas are those of hereditary Harrop
formulas, which we will refer to as the HH logic. Consider for instance the problem
of deﬁning the data type for untyped λ-terms. One ﬁrst introduces the following
constants:
app : tm→ tm→ tm abs : (tm→ tm) → tm
where the type tm denotes the syntactic category of λ-terms and app and abs encode
application and abstraction, respectively. The property of being a λ-term is then
deﬁned via the following theory:
∧
M
∧
N(lam M ∧ lam N ⇒ lam (app M N)) &
∧
M((
∧
x.lam x ⇒ lam (M x)) ⇒ lam (abs M))
where
∧
is the universal quantiﬁer and ⇒ is implication.
Reasoning about object systems encoded in HH is reduced to reasoning about
the structure of proofs in HH. McDowell and Miller formalize this kind of reasoning
in the logic FOλΔIN [10], which is an extension of ﬁrst-order intuitionistic logic with
ﬁxed points and natural numbers induction. This is done by encoding the sequent
calculus of HH inside FOλΔIN and prove properties about it. We refer to HH as
object logic and FOλΔIN as meta logic. McDowell and Miller considered diﬀerent
styles of encoding and concluded that explicit representations of hypotheses and,
more importantly, eigenvariables of the object logic are required in order to capture
some statements about object logic provability in the meta logic [11]. One typical
example involves the use of hypothetical and generic reasoning as follows: Suppose
that the following formula is provable in HH.
∧
x.p x s⇒
∧
y.p y t⇒ p x t.
By inspection on the inference rules of HH, one observes that this is only possible if
s and t are syntactically equal. This observation comes from the fact that the right
introduction rule for universal quantiﬁer, reading the rule bottom-up, introduces
new constants, or eigenvariables. The quantiﬁed variables x and y will be replaced
by distinct eigenvariables and hence the only matching hypothesis for p x t would
be p x s, and therefore s and t has to be equal. Let HH F denote the provability of
the formula F in HH. Then in the meta logic, we would want to be able to prove
the statement:
∀s∀t.(HH
∧
x.p x s⇒
∧
y.p y t⇒ p x t) ⊃ s = t.
The question is then how we would interpret the object logic eigenvariables in the
meta logic. It is argued in [11] that the existing quantiﬁers in FOλΔIN cannot be
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used to capture the behaviours of object logic eigenvariables directly. McDowell and
Miller then resort to a non-logical encoding technique (in the sense that no logical
connectives are used) which has some similar ﬂavor to the use of de Bruijn indexes.
The use of this encoding technique, however, has a consequence that substitutions
in the object logic has to be formalized explicitly.
Motivated by the above mentioned limitation of FOλΔIN, Miller and Tiu later
introduced a new quantiﬁer ∇ to FOλΔIN which allows one to move the binders
from the object logic to the meta logic. A generic judgment in the object logic,
for instance HH
∧
x.Gx is reﬂected in the meta logic as ∇x. HH Gx. More
generally, object logic eigenvariables are ∇-quantiﬁed at the meta level. This meta
logic, called FOλΔ∇ [17], allows one to perform case analyses on the provability
of the object logic. Tiu later extended FOλΔ∇ with induction and co-induction
rules, resulting in the logic Linc [25]. However, some inductive properties about the
object logic are not provable in Linc, e.g, the implication
HH
∧
x.Gx ⊃ ∀t. HH Gt(1)
which states the extensional property of object logic universal quantiﬁcation.
The inductive proof of the formula (1) would require an induction hypothesis
that quantiﬁes over object logic signatures, i.e., it is a statement of the sort
“for all” z, ∀H∇z(HH
∧
x.H z x ⊃ ∀t. HH H z t)
where z is a list of object logic eigenvariables occurring in the object sequents. An
obvious extension to Linc to formalize this statement would be to allow for quantiﬁ-
cation over arbitrary lists of variables which act like variable contexts to the object
logic. However this is technically non-trivial and may require complicated proof
theory. In this paper we follow an easier but weaker approach, which is expressive
enough to allow for inductive reasoning over object speciﬁcations involving bind-
ings. Instead of having explicit quantiﬁcation over variable contexts, we require
every proposition to hold in any variable context. This eﬀectively translates to
admitting the following axiom in FOλΔ∇:
B ⊃ ∇x.B, x is not free in B,(2)
which is not provable in FOλΔ∇. Extensions to FOλΔ∇ have been previously
proposed in a couple of previous works [5,2]. In both works, it is suggested that
adding the following axioms
∇x∇y.B x y ⊃ ∇y∇x.B x y and B ≡ ∇x.B,(3)
where x is not free in B in the second scheme, to FOλΔ∇ would result in a natural
semantics for the extended logic. As it turns out, admitting these axioms would
give a simpler proof theory too, compared to just having (2). We therefore adopt
the axioms (3) in the extension of FOλΔ∇ discussed in the paper. This extended
logic, called LGω, is obtained by extending FOλΔ∇ with natural number induction
and with the axiom schemes (3). We show that inductive properties of λ-tree syntax
speciﬁcations can be stated directly and in a purely logical fashion, and proved in
LGω.
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Relation to nominal logic
To guarantee good proof search behavior and syntactic consistency of the logic
LGω (i.e., cut-elimination), the axiom schemes (3) need to be absorbed into the
rules of the proof system of LGω. There are at least a couple of ways of achieving
this. One way is to extend the proof system of FOλΔ∇ with some structural rules
corresponding to the axioms (3). The other is to adopt the notion of equivariant
predicates as in nominal logic [21], that is, provability of a predicate is invariant
under permutations of names. We show here the second approach, which is simpler.
The equivalent of the two formulations can be found in an extended version of
the paper [26]. The equivariant principle is technically enforced by introducing a
countably inﬁnite set of name constants into the logic, and change the identity rule
of the logic to allow equivalence under permutations of name constants:
π.B = π′.B′
Γ, B − B′
id
where π and π′ are permutations on names. LGω is in fact very close to nominal
logic, when we consider only the behaviours of logical connectives. In particular, the
quantiﬁer ∇ in LGω shares the same properties, in relation to other connectives of
the logic, with the Nquantiﬁer in nominal logic. However, there are two important
diﬀerences in our approach. First, we do not attempt to redeﬁne α-conversion and
substitutions in LGω in terms of permutations (or swapping) and the notion of
freshness as in nominal logic. Name swapping and freshness constraints are not
part of the syntax of LGω. These notions are present only in the meta theory of
the logic. In LGω, for example, variables are always considered to have empty
support, that is, π.x = x for every permutation π. This is because we restrict
substitutions to the “closed” ones, in the sense that no name constants can appear in
the substitutions. A restricted form of open substitutions can be recovered indirectly
at the meta theory of LGω. The fact that variables have empty support allows
one to work with permutation free formulas and terms. So in LGω, we can prove
that p x a ⊃ p x b, where a and b are names, without using explicit axioms of
permutations and freshness. In nominal logic, one would prove this by using the
swapping axiom p x a ⊃ p ((a b).x) ((a b).b), where (a b) denotes a swapping of
a and b, and then show that (a b).x = x. The latter might not be valid if x is
substituted by a, for example. The validity of this formula in nominal logic would
therefore depend on the assumption on the support of x.
The second diﬀerence between LGω and nominal logic is that LGω allows closed
terms (again, in the sense that no name constants appear in them) of type name,
while in nominal logic, allowing such terms would lead to inconsistency [21]. As
an example, the type tm in the encoding of λ-terms mentioned previously can be
treated as a nominal type in LGω. This has an important consequence that we do
not need to redeﬁne the notion of substitutions for the encoded λ-terms, which is
instead mapped to β-reduction in the meta language of LGω.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a
proof system for LGω. Section 3 states some meta theories of LGω, in particular
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cut-elimination and a translation from LGω without ﬁxed points and induction to
FOλ∇ with the axioms (3). Section 4 shows an encoding of HH logic in LGω
and how some properties of the object logic can be formalized in LGω. Section 5
illustrates the use of HH to specify the typing judgments of λ-calculus and the
evaluation relation on λ-terms. It also shows an example of reasoning about the
encoded λ-calculus, by induction on the provability of the typing judgments in the
object logic HH. Section 6 discusses some related and future work. The proofs of
the main results in this paper can be in an extended version of the paper [26].
2 A logic for generic judgments
We ﬁrst deﬁne the core fragment of the logic LGω which does not have ﬁxed point
rules or induction. The starting point is the logic FOλ∇ introduced in [17]. FOλ∇
is an extension of a subset of Church’s Simple Theory of Types in which formulas
are given the type o. The core fragment of LGω, which we refer to as LG, shares the
same set of connectives as FOλ∇, namely, ⊥, , ∧, ∨, ⊃, ∀τ , ∃τ and ∇τ . The type
τ in the quantiﬁers is restricted to that which does not contain the type o. Hence
the logic is essentially ﬁrst-order. We abbreviate (B ⊃ C) ∧ (C ⊃ B) as B ≡ C.
To enforce equivariant reasoning, we introduce a distinguished set of base types,
called nominal types, which is denoted with N . Nominal types are ranged over by
ι. We restrict the ∇ quantiﬁer to nominal types. For each nominal type ι ∈ N ,
we assume an inﬁnite number of constants of that type. These constants are called
nominal constants. We denote the family of nominal constants by CN . The role
of the nominal constants is to enforce the notion of equivariance: provability of
formulas is invariant under permutations of nominal constants. Depending on the
application, we might also assume a set of non-nominal constants, which is denoted
by K.
We assume the usual notion of capture-avoiding substitutions. Substitutions are
ranged over by θ and ρ. Application of substitutions is written in a postﬁx notation,
e.g., tθ is an application of θ to the term t. Given two substitutions θ and θ′, we
denote their composition by θ ◦ θ′ which is deﬁned as t(θ ◦ θ′) = (tθ)θ′. A typing
context is a set of typed variables or constants. The judgment Δ  t : τ denotes
the fact that the term t has type the simple type τ , given the typing context Δ.
Its operational semantics is the usual type system for Church’s simple type theory.
A signature is a set of variables. A substitution θ respects a given signature Σ if
there exists a set of typed variables Σ′ such that for every x : τ ∈ Σ which is in the
domain of θ, it holds that K ∪ Σ′  θ(x) : τ. We denote by Σθ the minimal set of
variables satisfying the above condition. The substitution θ in this case is called a
Σ-substitution. We assume that variables, free or bound, are of a diﬀerent syntactic
category from constants.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A permutation on CN is a bijection from CN to CN . The permu-
tations on CN are ranged over by π. Application of a permutation π to a nominal
constant a is denoted with π(a). We shall be concerned only with permutations
which respect types, i.e., for every a : ι, π(a) : ι. Further, we shall also restrict to
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permutations which are ﬁnite, that is, the set {a | π(a) = a} is ﬁnite. Application of
a permutation to an arbitrary term (or formula), written π.t, is deﬁned as follows:
π.a = π(a), if a ∈ CN . π.c = c, if c ∈ CN . π.x = x
π.(M N) = (π.M) (π.N) π.(λx.M) = λx.(π.M)
A permutation involving only two nominal constants is called swapping. We use
(a b), where a and b are constants of the same type, to denote the swapping {a →
b, b → a}.
The support of a term (or formula) t, written supp(t), is the set of nominal
constants appearing in it. It is clear from the above deﬁnition that if supp(t) is
empty, then π.t = t for all π. The deﬁnition of Σ-substitution implies that for every
θ and for every x ∈ Σ, θ(x) has empty support. Therefore Σ-substitutions and
permutations commute, that is, (π.t)θ = π.(tθ).
A sequent in LGω is an expression of the form Σ;Γ − C where Σ is a signature
and the formulas in Γ ∪ {C} are in βη-normal form. The free variables of Γ and
C are among the variables in Σ. The inference rules for the core fragment of LGω,
i.e., the logic LG, are given in Figure 1.
In the ∇L and ∇R rules, a denotes a nominal constant. In the ∃L and ∀R
rules, we use raising [14] to encode the dependency of the quantiﬁed variable on
the support of B, since we do not allow Σ-substitutions to mention any nominal
constants. In the rules, the variable h has its type raised in the following way:
suppose c is the list c1 : ι1, . . . , cn : ιn and the quantiﬁed variable x is of type τ .
Then the variable h is of type: ι1 → ι2 → . . . → ιn → τ. This raising technique is
similar to that of FOλΔ∇, and is used to encode explicitly the minimal support of
the quantiﬁed variable. Its use prevents one from mixing the scopes of ∀ (dually, ∃)
and ∇. That is, it prevents the formula ∀x∇y.p x y ≡ ∇y∀x.p x y, and its dual, to
be proved.
Looking at the introduction rules for ∀ and ∃, one might notice the asymmetry
between the left and the right introduction rules. The left rule for ∀ allows instanti-
ations with terms containing any nominal constants while the raised variable in the
right introduction rule of ∀ takes into account only those which are in the support
of the quantiﬁed formula. However, we will see that we can extend the dependency
of the raised variable to an arbitrary number of fresh nominal constants not in
the support without aﬀecting the provability of the sequent (see Lemma 3.5 and
Lemma 3.6).
We now extend the logic LG with a proof theoretic notion of equality and ﬁxed
points, following on works by Hallnas and Schroeder-Heister [7,23], Girard [6] and
McDowell and Miller [10]. The equality rules are as follows:
{Σθ; Γθ − Cθ | (λc.t)θ =βη (λc.s)θ}
Σ;Γ, s = t − C
eqL
Σ;Γ − t = t
eqR
where supp(s = t) = {c} and θ is a Σ-substitution in the eqL rule. In the eqL rule,
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π.B = π′.B′
Σ;Γ, B − B′
idπ
Σ; Γ − B Σ;B,Δ − C
Σ;Γ,Δ − C
cut
Σ;Γ, B, B − C
Σ;Γ, B − C
cL
Σ;Γ,⊥ − C
⊥L
Σ;Γ − 
R
Σ;Γ, Bi − C
Σ;Γ, B1 ∧ B2 − C
∧L, i ∈ {1, 2}
Σ; Γ − B Σ;Γ − C
Σ;Γ − B ∧ C
∧R
Σ; Γ, B − C Σ; Γ,D − C
Σ; Γ, B ∨D − C
∨L
Σ;Γ − Bi
Σ; Γ − B1 ∨ B2
∨R, i ∈ {1, 2}
Σ; Γ − B Σ;Γ, D − C
Σ; Γ, B ⊃ D − C
⊃ L
Σ;Γ, B − C
Σ; Γ − B ⊃ C
⊃ R
Σ,K, CN  t : τ Σ; Γ, B[t/x] − C
Σ;Γ, ∀τx.B − C
∀L
Σ, h; Γ − B[hc/x]
Σ; Γ − ∀x.B
∀R, h ∈ Σ, supp(B) = {c}
Σ;Γ, B[a/x] − C
Σ;Γ,∇x.B − C
∇L, a ∈ supp(B)
Σ; Γ − B[a/x]
Σ; Γ − ∇x.B
∇R, a ∈ supp(B)
Σ, h; Γ, B[hc/x] − C
Σ;Γ,∃x.B − C
∃L, h ∈ Σ, supp(B) = {c}
Σ,K, CN  t : τ Σ; Γ − B[t/x]
Σ; Γ − ∃τ x.B
∃R
Fig. 1. The inference rules of LG
the substitution θ is a uniﬁer of λc.s and λc.t. Note that the λ-abstraction on c
in eqL is quite redundant, since Σ-substitutions cannot mention nominal constants
and it will be equally valid to say that θ is a uniﬁer of t and s. The use of λ’s in the
rule is just to make it clear that the uniﬁcation problem that arises in the rule is
the usual higher-order uniﬁcation and to conform with the formulations of equality
rules in Linc [18,25].
We specify the premise of the rule as a set to mean that every element of the set
is a premise. Since the terms s and t can be arbitrary higher-order terms, in general
the set of their uniﬁers can be inﬁnite. However, in some restricted cases, e.g., when
λc.s and λc.t are higher-order pattern terms [13,19], if both terms are uniﬁable, then
there exists a most general uniﬁer. The applications we are considering are those
which satisfy the higher-order pattern restrictions.
Deﬁnition 2.2 To each atomic formula, we associate a ﬁxed point equation, or
a deﬁnition clause, following the terminology of FOλΔ∇. A deﬁnition clause is
written ∀x.p x

= B where the free variables of B are among x. The predicate p x
is called the head of the deﬁnition clause, and B is called the body. A deﬁnition is
a set of deﬁnition clauses. We often omit the outer quantiﬁers when referring to a
deﬁnition clause.
The introduction rules for deﬁned atoms are as follows:
Σ; Γ, B[t/x] − C
Σ;Γ, pt − C
defL, p x

= B
Σ;Γ − B[t/x]
Σ; Γ − pt
defR, p x

= B
In order to prove the cut-elimination theorem and the consistency of LGω, we
allow only deﬁnition clauses which satisfy an equivariance preserving condition and
a certain positivity condition, so as to guarantee the existence of ﬁxed points.
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Deﬁnition 2.3 We associate with each predicate symbol p a natural number, the
level of p. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is deﬁned as follows:
(i) lvl(p t¯) = lvl(p)
(ii) lvl(⊥) = lvl() = 0
(iii) lvl(B ∧ C) = lvl(B ∨ C) = max(lvl(B), lvl(C))
(iv) lvl(B ⊃ C) = max(lvl(B) + 1, lvl(C))
(v) lvl(∀x.B) = lvl(∇x.B) = lvl(∃x.B) = lvl(B).
A deﬁnition clause p x

= B is stratiﬁed if lvl(B) ≤ lvl(p) and supp(B) = ∅. We
consider only deﬁnition clauses which are stratiﬁed.
An example that violates the ﬁrst restriction in Deﬁnition 2.3 is the deﬁnition
p

= p ⊃ ⊥. In [23], Schroeder-Heister shows that admitting this deﬁnition in a logic
with contraction leads to inconsistency. To see why we need the second restriction
on name constants, consider the deﬁnition q x

= (x = a), where a is a nominal
constant. Let b be a nominal constant diﬀerent from a. Then q b is both true, since
it is equivariant to q a and false, by the deﬁnition of ﬁxed point.
In examples and applications, we often express deﬁnition clauses with patterns
in the heads. Let us consider, for example, a deﬁnition clause for lists. We ﬁrst
introduce a type lst to denote lists of elements of type α, and the constants
nil : lst :: : α → lst→ lst
which denote the empty list and a constructor to build a list from an element of type
α and another list. The latter will be written in the inﬁx notation. The deﬁnition
clause for lists is as follows.
list L

= L = nil ∨ ∃αA∃lstL
′.L = (A :: L′) ∧ list L′.
Using patterns, the above deﬁnition of lists can be rewritten as
list nil

= . list (A :: L)

= list L.
We shall often work directly with this patterned notation for deﬁnition clauses.
For this purpose, we introduce the notion of patterned deﬁnitions. A patterned
deﬁnition clause is written ∀x.H

= B where the free variables of H and B are
among x. The stratiﬁcation of deﬁnitions in Deﬁnition 2.3 applies to patterned
deﬁnitions as well. Since the patterned deﬁnition clauses are not allowed to have
free occurrences of nominal constants, in matching the heads of the clauses with an
atomic formula in a sequent, we need to raise the variables of the clauses to account
for nominal constants that are in the support of the introduced formula. Given a
patterned deﬁnition clause ∀x1 . . . ∀xn.H

= B its raised clause with respect to the
list of constants c1 : ι1 . . . cn : ιn is
∀h1 . . . ∀hn.H[h1 c/x1, . . . , hn c/xn]

= B[h1 c/x1, . . . , hn c/xn].
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The introduction rules for patterned deﬁnitions are
{Σθ;Bθ,Γθ − Cθ}θ
Σ;A,Γ − C
defL
Σ;Γ − Bθ
Σ;Γ − A
defR
In the defL rule, B is the body of the raised patterned clause ∀x1 . . . ∀xn.H

= B
and (λc.H)θ = (λc.A)θ where {c} is the support of A. In the defR rule, we match
A with the head of the clause, i.e., λc.A = (λc.H)θ. These patterned rules can be
derived using the non-patterned deﬁnition rules and the equality rules, as shown
in [25].
Natural number induction.
We introduce a type nt to denote natural numbers, with the usual constants
z : nt (zero) and s : nt → nt (the successor function), and a special predicate
nat : nt → o. The rules for natural number induction are the same as those in
FOλΔIN [10], which are the introduction rules for the predicate nat.
− D z j;D j − D (s j) Σ; Γ,D I − C
Σ;Γ, nat I − C
natL
Σ;Γ − nat z
natR
Σ;Γ − nat I
Σ;Γ − nat (s I)
natR
The logic LG extended with the equality, deﬁnitions and induction rules is re-
ferred to as LGω.
3 The meta theory of LGω
In this section we investigate some properties of the logic LGω. We ﬁrst look at
the properties of the ∇ quantiﬁer in relation to other connectives. The proof of the
following proposition is straightforward by inspection on the rules of LG.
Proposition 3.1 The following formulas are provable in LG:
(i) ∇x.(Bx ∧ Cx) ≡ ∇x.Bx ∧∇x.Cx.
(ii) ∇x.(Bx ⊃ Cx) ≡ ∇x.Bx ⊃ ∇x.Cx.
(iii) ∇x.(Bx ∨ Cx) ≡ ∇x.Bx ∨∇x.Cx.
(iv) ∇x.B ≡ B, provided that x is not free in B.
(v) ∇x∇y.Bxy ≡ ∇y∇x.Bxy.
(vi) ∀x.Bx ⊃ ∇x.Bx.
(vii) ∇x.Bx ⊃ ∃x.Bx.
The formulas (i) – (iii) are provable in FOλ∇. The proposition is true also in
nominal logic with ∇ replaced by N.
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The following properties concern the transformation of derivations. Provability
is preserved under Σ-substitutions, permutations and a restricted form of name
substitutions.
Lemma 3.2 Substitutions. Let Π be a proof of Σ;Γ − C and let θ be a Σ-
substitution. Then there exists a proof Π′ of Σθ; Γθ − Cθ.
Lemma 3.3 Permutations. Let Π be a proof of Σ;B1, . . . , Bn − B0. Then there
exists a proof Π′ of Σ;π1.B1, . . . , πn.Bn − π0.B0.
Lemma 3.4 Restricted name substitutions. Let Π be a proof of
Σ, x : ι;B1, . . . , Bn − B0.
Then there exists a proof of Π′ of Σ;B1[a1/x], . . . , Bn[an/x] − B0[a0/x], where
ai ∈ supp(Bi) for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
The next two lemmas are crucial to the cut-elimination proof: they allow one
to reintroduce the symmetry between ∀L and ∀R, and dually, between ∃L and ∃R
rules.
Lemma 3.5 Support extension. Let Π be a proof of Σ, h; Γ − B[h a/x] where
{a} = supp(B), h ∈ Σ and h is not free in Γ and B. Let c be a ﬁnite list of
nominal constants not in the support of B. Then there exists a proof Π′ of Σ, h′; Γ −
B[h′ ac/x].
Lemma 3.6 Support extension. Let Π be a proof of Σ, h;B[h a/x],Γ − C where
{a} = supp(B), h ∈ Σ and h is not free in Γ, B and C. Let c be a ﬁnite list
of nominal constants not in the support of B. Then there exists a proof Π′ of
Σ, h′;B[h′ ac/x],Γ − C where h′ ∈ Σ.
The main result on the meta theory of LGω is the cut-elimination theorem, from
which the consistency of the logic follows.
Theorem 3.7 The cut rule is admissible in LGω.
Corollary 3.8 The logic LGω is consistent, i.e., it is not the case that both A and
A ⊃ ⊥ are provable.
Finally, we show that the formulation of LG is equivalent to FOλ∇ extended
with the axiom schemes of name permutations and weakening.
Theorem 3.9 Let F be a formula which contains no occurrences of nominal con-
stants. Then F is provable in FOλ∇ extended with the axiom schemes B ≡ ∇x.B
and ∇x∇y.B x y ⊃ ∇y∇x.B x y if and only if F is provable in LG.
4 Encoding an object logic
We now consider an encoding of the logic HH mentioned in the introduction in
LGω. The encoding of this object logic has been done in FOλΔIN by McDowell and
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seqI L tt

= .
seqI L 〈A〉

= elem A L.
seq(s I) L (A & B)

= seqI L A ∧ seqI L B.
seq(s I) L (A ⇒ B)

= seqI (A :: L) B.
seq(s I) L (
∧
x.Gx)

= ∇x.seqI L Gx.
seq(s I) L
∨
x.Gx

= ∃x.seqI L Gx.
seq(s I) L 〈A〉

= ∃B.prog A B ∧ seqI L B.
Fig. 2. Deﬁnition of an object logic.
Miller [11]. The formalization of the object logic properties in this section follows
closely the FOλΔIN encoding. The only major diﬀerence is that we do not need an
explicit encoding of eigenvariables; eigenvariables are mapped to nominal constants
in the meta logic LGω.
The object logic formulas are generated by the following grammar.
D ::= A | G ⇒ A |
∧
τ x.D
G ::= A | tt | G& G | A ⇒ G |
∧
ι x.G |
∨
τ .G
where A ranges over atomic (object-level) formula, ⇒, &,
∧
and
∨
denote impli-
cation, conjunction, universal quantiﬁer and existential quantiﬁer, respectively. D
and G represent deﬁnite clauses and goal formulas, respectively. Notice that in goal
formulas, universal quantiﬁcation is restricted to nominal types. The sequent rules
for HH are the standard right introduction rules for the logical connectives plus
the backchaining rule:
Γ,
∧
x.G ⊃ A −→ Gθ
Γ,
∧
x.G ⊃ A −→ A′
bc,Aθ = A′
This sequent system is complete for the HH fragment of intuitionistic logic, as a
consequence of uniform provability of intuitionistic logic [15].
In order to encode the object-logic formulas into LGω, we ﬁrst introduce some
types and constants. The object logic formulas are given the type prp, while atomic
formulas are given the type atm. The formulas of HH are encoded using the
following constants:
〈 〉 : atm→ prp & : prp→ prp→ prp
∧
τ : (ι → prp)→ prp
tt : prp ⇒: atm→ prp→ prp
∨
τ : (τ → prp)→ prp
We denote the encoding of an object level formula A in LGω with [[A]].
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X, I2; seqI2 [p X] 〈p a〉 − ⊥
X, I2;∇y.seqI2 [p X] 〈p y〉 − ⊥
∇L
X, I1; seqI1 [p X] (
∧
y.〈p y〉) − ⊥
defL
X, I; seqI nil (p X ⇒
∧
y.〈p y〉) − ⊥
defL
− ∀X∀I.(seqI nil (p X ⇒
∧
y.〈p y〉) ⊃ ⊥)
∀R;⊃ R
Fig. 3. A derivation in LGω.
Since the set of deﬁnite clauses in the sequents does not change in the proofs in
HH, we will not put them explicitly in the HH sequents in their encoding in LGω.
Hence hypotheses of HH sequents are lists of atomic formulas. The object logic
sequent is represented using the predicate seq : nt → atmlist → prp → o where
atmlist is the type for lists of atomic formulas, with the usual constructors nil and
:: . The natural number in the encoding of sequents will be used as a measure of
the length of object logic proofs. Inductive properties about the provability in HH
will be proved using this measure. An object sequent Γ −→ A is represented as the
atomic formula (seqI [[Γ]] [[A]]) in LG
ω. We encode deﬁnite clauses using a predicate
called prog : atm → prp → o. A deﬁnite clause
∧
x.G ⇒ A is encoded as the
deﬁnition clause ∀x.prog A G

= . The patterned deﬁnition of the sequent rules of
HH is given in Figure 2. It uses the following deﬁnition clauses.
listi nil

= . list(s i) (A :: L)

= listi L.
list L

= ∃i.nat i ∧ listi L.
elem A (A :: L)

= . elem A (B :: L)

= elem A L.
We refer to this deﬁnition together with the deﬁnition in Figure 2 as D(HH) and
any additional deﬁnite clauses with D(prog).
Example:
The formula p X ⇒
∧
y.p y is not provable in the empty theory, whatever the
value of X is. This fact is formalized in LGω as the formula
∀X∀I.(seqI nil (p X ⇒
∧
y.〈p y〉) ⊃ ⊥).
A partial derivation of this formula in LGω is shown in Figure 3. In the ﬁgure
the notation [pX] stands for the list (pX :: nil). The derivation is completed by
applying defL to the topmost sequent, resulting in two matching cases: the identity
rule and the backchaining rule. Since we assume no deﬁnite clauses, this leaves us
with proving the sequent: X, I2; elem (p X) (p a :: nil) − ⊥. Applying defL to this
sequent results in the sequent X, I2; elem (p X) nil − ⊥, since λa.p X and λa.p a
are not uniﬁable. Another application of defL gives us empty premise and hence
the sequent is provable. 
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It is straightforward to see that the structure of the HH proofs corresponds to
the structure of proofs of its encoding in LGω; in particular, the backchaining rule
in HH corresponds to the defR rule (for the patterned deﬁnition) in LGω. We now
state some properties of the encoding of HH in LGω.
Theorem 4.1 Let D(prog) be a deﬁnition corresponding to a set of deﬁnite clauses
P. Then the sequent P,Γ −→ G is derivable in HH if and only if seqi [[Γ]] [[G]] is
derivable in LGω with the deﬁnition D(prog)∪D(HH) for some natural number i.
Theorem 4.2 The following formulas are provable in LGω with the deﬁnition of
the object logic HH:
(i) Structural rules: ∀L∀L
′∀G∀i. nat i ⊃ list L ⊃ list L′
(∀A.elem A L ⊃ elem A L′) ⊃ seqi L G ⊃ seqi L
′ G.
(ii) Atomic cut: ∀L∀G∀A.list L ⊃ ∃i.(nat i ∧ seqi L (A ⇒ G)) ⊃
∃i.(nat i ∧ seqi L 〈A〉) ⊃ ∃i.nat i ∧ seqi L G.
(iii) Specialization: ∀L∀G∀i.nat i ⊃ list L ⊃ seq(s i) L (
∧
G) ⊃ ∀x.seqi L (Gx).
We conclude this section by a remark that ∇ is strictly speaking not necessary
for capturing object logic provability, as Theorem 4.2 (3) shows, rather it is the
use of nominal constants to model eigenvariables that allows that. The use of ∇,
however, results in a more natural correspondence between the encoding of HH
and its actual sequent proofs.
5 Reasoning about operational semantics
Following McDowell and Miller [11], we use the encoding of HH in LGω to specify
and reason about the operational semantics of simply typed λ-calculus. Reasoning
about more complicated languages like PCF can be done as well using a similar
approach (see [11]).
We introduce a type ty to denote object-level types. The type tm denotes the
object-level λ-terms and is considered a nominal type. The language of the (object-
level) λ-terms is encoded using the following constants:
app : tm→ tm→ tm abs : ty → (tm→ tm) → tm
which denote application and abstraction, respectively. The object-level type con-
structor, i.e., the ‘arrow’, is encoded via the constant ar : ty → ty → ty. Object-level
base types are ranged over by α.
The evaluation relation and the typing judgments of the simply typed calculus
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are given as deﬁnite clauses below.
eval (abs T M) (abs T M) ⇐ tt.
eval (app M N) V ⇐
∨
P
∨
T.eval M (abs P T ) & eval (P N) V.
typeof (abs T M) (ar T T ′) ⇐
∧
x.typeof x T ⇒ typeof (Mx) T ′.
typeof (app M N) T ⇐
∨
T ′.typeof M (ar T ′ T ) & typeof N T ′.
It is straightforward to translate these clauses to prog clauses.
We state a couple of properties here as formulas in LGω. In the following
theorems, we use the notation L G to denote the formula ∃i.nat i∧ seqi L G. If L
is nil we simply write G.
Theorem 5.1 Subject reduction. The following formula is provable
∀M∀V ∀T.  〈eval M V 〉 ∧ 〈typeof M T 〉 ⊃ 〈typeof V T 〉.
A proof of a similar theorem is given in [11] for the untyped λ-term in the
logic FOλΔIN. This proof can be adapted straightforwardly to give a proof for the
above theorem. A more interesting property is the determinacy of type assignments,
provided that the typing context is well-formed, that is, each variable in the context
is assigned a unique type. The well-formedness of a typing context L is speciﬁed as
the formula:
∀X∀T1∀T2.elem (typeof X T1) L ⊃ elem (typeof X T2) L ⊃ T1 = T2.
The above formula will be denoted by ctx L.
Theorem 5.2 The following formula is provable:
∀L∀X∀T1∀T2. list L ⊃ ctx L ⊃ L  〈typeof X T1〉 ⊃ L  〈typeof X T2〉 ⊃ T1 = T2.
6 Related and future work
There have been many previous related works in providing frameworks for higher-
order abstract syntax, or more generally abstract syntax with bindings. A non-
exhaustive list includes encoding in proof assistants like Coq [4], HOL [27], Is-
abelle [28], and Twelf [24], categorical frameworks [8], the theory of contexts [9],
nominal logic [21], and proof search frameworks [11,25]. The approach taken here is
similar to the latter; the novelty of our work lies in the use of equivariance principle
within the usual style of higher-order abstract syntax speciﬁcations. An immediate
future work will be to implement the logic LGω, possibly on top of an existing proof
assistant, and to perform large case studies, in particular, the problem sets put out
in the POPLMark Challenge [1].
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In the current work we show only the treatment of natural number induction.
Extensions to iterated (co-)inductive deﬁnitions can be done in a similar way as
in [18,25].
Semantics of LG. There have been several attempts at giving a semantics for
the logic FOλ∇: Cheney and Gabbay proposed an encoding into nominal logic [5,2],
Miculan and Yemane [12] gave a categorical semantics and Scho¨pp [22] gave a Tarski-
style semantics and a categorical semantics for a classical version of FOλΔ∇. In
these works, it is suggested that extending FOλ∇ with the axiom schemes (3)
would result in a natural semantics for ∇. The works by Miculan and Yemane and
Scho¨pp seem closer to the logic LG and could very well serve as a basis for ﬁnding
a categorical model for LG. There are some similarities between LG and Nominal
Logic, but the treatment of substitutions and the addition of closed terms of type
name in LG make it not obvious whether the support models of Nominal Logic can
be used for LG. We leave the investigation of support models for LG (or a classical
version of LG), such as the ones in [21,3], as a future work.
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